To the Editor:ÐI applaud Straus et al. 1 for evaluating a combination of clinical findingsÐhistory of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), wheezes, and forced expiratory time (FET)Ðin evaluating test measures for COPD and for assessing time intervals for performing bedside maneuvers. However, I take issue with several points in the article. First, the authors downplay the significance of a forced expiratory time >9 seconds because the post-test probability increases only from 10% to 40%. A positive FET does have merit, insofar as spirometric testing, the gold standard, will be ordered. Second, the authors infer that the absence of the combination excludes COPD. A pretest probability of 40% decreases only to 17% with a likelihood ratio (LR) of 0.3. I doubt any clinician would dismiss COPD with a post-test probability of 17%. Third, the authors arrived at the LR +59 for the combination by multiplying LRs for each. They have included``crude'' LRs without corresponding sensitivities and specificities for history of COPD or FET. The sensitivities, specificities, and likelihood ratios could be calculated from a 2 Â 2 table using spirometry positive (disease) and spirometry negative (no disease) with index test positive (combination of findings) and index test negative (2/3 positive, 1/3 positive, or 0/3 positive) categories. Finally, I find it odd that the sensitivity for wheezing is 35% and the``estimated'' sensitivity for the combination is 70% based on the LR À0.30. In order to obtain an LR +59, the false-positive rate must be slightly higher than 1%. As a result, LRÀ is represented by 30%/99% or 0.30. Intuitively, combinations of findings are much more likely to have lower sensitivities than single findings, whereas the specificity would be expected to be higher with combinations than with one finding. Reply:ÐWe appreciate Dr. Nardone's comments and his interest in our paper. We concur with Dr. Nardone that spirometry must be done in people with prolonged forced expiratory time.
As we stated in our article, forced expiratory time is not sufficient on its own to diagnose chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. 1 Likelihood ratios greater than 10 and less than 0.10 are very useful in either ruling in or ruling out a target disorder. 2 The pretest probability of disease becomes particularly important when likelihood ratios are between 0.10 and 10. In our previous paper, we stated that if the patient's pretest probability is 10%, 3 and applying a likelihood ratio of 0.3, the posttest probability is sufficiently low that we would feel comfortable in ruling out the disease. However, if the pretest probability for a particular patient were higher, the posttest probability would be higher, such that we might not be comfortable ruling out the disease. Finally, the combined likelihood ratio of 59 was obtained from multiplying the adjusted likelihood ratios (adjusted for their nonindependence), not from the crude likelihood ratios. Therefore, they cannot be used directly to calculate sensitivity and specificity. To the Editor:ÐMcGee 1 does a service for us by focusing on the likelihood ratio as one ofÐif not the most importantÐ operating characteristic of a diagnostic test. He suggests that its lack of use is due to the burdensome calculations necessary for conversion between odds and probabilities. Although this may be true, we offer an alternative explanation. Probabilities differ from likelihoods in important ways. 2 With probabilities, the data are random and hypotheses are fixed, allowing one to develop conditional probabilities. Conversely, with likelihoods, the data are fixed and the hypotheses are random, as seen in a differential diagnosis. Likelihoods do not follow the rules of probability theory. Odds have made intuitive sense to the man on the street who bets on categorical events like winning a horserace. Odds also apply to such things as whether a solitary pulmonary nodule is malignant or benign or if a woman is pregnant or not. That we in medicine have chosen to remain with probabilities and dismiss odds shows that we have yet to grasp this subtle but important distinction. With respect to an interpretation of likelihood ratios such as that given in McGee's Table 2 , Jaeschke et al. 3 from the Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group note the following:
.``Likelihood ratios greater than 10 or less than 0.1 generate large and often conclusive changes from pretest to post-test probability. . Likelihood ratios of 5 to 10 and 0.1 to 0.2 generate moderate shifts in pretest to posttest probability. . Likelihood ratios of 2 to 5 and 0.2 to 0.5 generate small (but sometimes important) changes in probability.
. Likelihood ratios of 1 to 2 and 0.5 to 1 alter probability to a small (and rarely important) degree.''
The divergent relationship between odds and probabilities is important in decision-making involving probabilities less than 10% and greater than 90%. If a man has a solitary pulmonary nodule with a 50% probability (odds of 1) of malignancy, would his doctor and he want a hypothetical test that had a likelihood ratio of 13 or one with 101 to rule it in? If the first test was positive, the probability would be 93%, compared with a probability of 99% with a positive second testÐa mere difference of 6%. Using odds, after a positive first test, he would have 13 chances of having the malignancy to 1 chance of its being benign, whereas with the second test positive, his odds increase to 101 chances of having a cancer to 1 not. This example involves probability ranges beyond the formula proposed by McGee.
Dreyfus and Dreyfus 4 have shown that the novice makes decisions in a protracted and laborious manner, using contextfree rules, with no base of experience, having no responsibility for the problem, and using conscious analysis. Conversely, the expert gathers information fluently and expeditiously by focusing on the situation at hand, using his or her base of experience, having a strong sense of responsibility that drives an intuitive decision. The range suggested by McGee limits us to probabilities between 10% (odds 1 to 9) and 90% (odds 9 to 1), in which an intuitive sense is meager. While this is sufficient for decisions regarding appendicitis or streptococcal pharyngitis, it is inadequate in dealing with problems such as malignancy. Ð JOHN C. PEIRCE, MD, MA, MS, RICHARD D. GERKIN, MD, MS, Good Samaritan Regional Medical Center, Phoenix, Ariz.
